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Abstract
Many online companies sell advertisement space in second-price auctions
with reserve. In this paper, we develop a probabilistic method to learn a
profitable strategy to set the reserve price. We use historical auction data
with features to fit a predictor of the best reserve price. This problem is
delicate—the structure of the auction is such that a reserve price set too
high is much worse than a reserve price set too low. To address this we
develop objective variables, a new framework for combining probabilistic
modeling with optimal decision-making. Objective variables are ”halluci-
nated observations” that transform the revenue maximization task into a
regularized maximum likelihood estimation problem, which we solve with
an EM algorithm. This framework enables a variety of prediction mech-
anisms to set the reserve price. As examples, we study objective variable
methods with regression, kernelized regression, and neural networks on sim-
ulated and real data. Our methods outperform previous approaches both
in terms of scalability and profit.
1 Introduction
Many online companies earn money from auctions, selling advertisement space or other
items. One widely used auction paradigm is second-price auctions with reserve [1]. In this
paradigm, the company sets a reserve price, the minimal price at which they are willing to
sell, before potential buyers cast their bids. If the highest bid is smaller than the reserve
price then there is no transaction; the company does not earn money. If any bid is larger
than the reserve price then the highest bidding buyer wins the auction, and the buyer pays
the larger of the second highest bid and the reserve price. To maximize their profit from a
specific auction, the host company wants to set the reserve price as close as possible to the
(future, unknown) highest bid, but no higher.
Imagine a company which hosts second-price auctions with reserve to sell baseball cards.
This auction mechanism is designed to be incentive compatible [2], which means that it
is advantageous for baseball enthusiasts to bid exactly what they are willing to pay for
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Figure 1: The revenue (a) and smoothed revenue (b) for example auctions from the eBay
data set.
the Stanley Kofax baseball card they are eager to own1. Before each auction starts the
company has to set the reserve price. When companies run millions of auctions of similar
items, they have the opportunity to learn how to opportunistically set the reserve price from
their historical data. In other words, they can try to learn their users’ value of different
items, and take advantage of this knowledge to maximize profit. This is the problem that
we address in this paper.
We develop a probabilistic model that predicts a good reserve price from prior features of
an auction. These features might be properties of the product, such as the placement of
the advertisement, properties of the potential buyers, such as each one’s average past bids,
or other external features, such as time of day of the auction. Given a data set of auction
features and bids, our method learns a predictor of reserve price that maximizes the profit
of future auctions.
A typical solution to such real-valued prediction problems is linear regression. However,
the solution to this problem is more delicate. The reason is that the revenue function for
each auction—the amount of money that we make as a function of the reserve price y—is
asymmetric. It remains constant to the second-highest bid b, increases to the highest bid
B, and is zero beyond the highest bid. Formally,
R(y,B, b) =


b if y < b
y if b ≤ y ≤ B
0 otherwise
. (1)
Fig. 1a illustrates this function for four auctions of sports collectibles from eBay. This
figure puts the delicacy into relief. The best reserve price, in retrospect, is the highest bid
B. But using a regression to predict the reserve price, e.g., by using the highest bid as the
response variable, neglects the important fact that overestimating the reserve price is much
worse than underestimating it. For example, consider the top left panel in Fig. 1a, which
might be the price of a Stanley Kofax baseball card. (Our data are anonymized, but we we
use this example for concreteness.) The best reserve price in retrospect is $43.03. A linear
regressor is just as likely to overestimate as to underestimate and hence fails to reflect that
setting the price in advance to $44.00 would yield zero earnings while setting it to $40.00
would yield the full reserve.
1In contrast, the auction mechanism used on eBay is not incentive compatible since the bids are
not sealed. As a result, experienced bidders refrain from bidding the true amount they are willing
to pay until seconds before the auction ends to keep sale prices low.
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To solve this problem we develop a new idea, the objective variable. Objective variables use
the machinery of probabilistic models to reason about difficult prediction problems, such
as one that seeks to optimize Eq.1. Specifically, objective variables enable us to formulate
probabilistic models for which MAP estimation directly uncovers profitable decision-making
strategies. We develop and study this technique to set the reserve price in second-price
auctions.
In more detail, our aim is to find a parameterized mechanism f(xi;w) to set the reserve price
from the auction features xi. In our study, we will consider a linear predictor, kernelized
regression, and a neural network. We observe a historical data set of N auctions that
contains features xi, and the auction’s two highest bids Bi and bi; we would like to learn
a good mechanism by optimizing the parameter w to maximize the total (retrospective)
revenue
∑N
i=1 R(f(xi;w), Bi, bi).
We solve this optimization problem by turning it into a maximum a posteriori (MAP) prob-
lem. For each auction we define new binary variables—these are the objective variables—
that are conditional on a reserve price. The probability of the objective variable being on
(i.e., equal to one) is related to the revenue obtained from the reserve price; it is more
likely on if the auction produces more revenue. We then set up a model that first assumes
each reserve price is drawn from the parameterized mechanism f(xi;w) and then draws the
corresponding objective variable. Note that this model is defined conditioned on our data,
the features and the bids. It is a model of the objective variables.
With the model defined, we now imagine a “data set” where all of the objective variables
are on, and then fit the parameters w subject to these data. Because of how we defined
the objective variables, the model will prefer more profitable settings of the parameters.
With this set up, fitting the parameters by MAP estimation is equivalent to finding the
parameters that maximize revenue.
The spirit of this technique is that the objective variables are likely to be on when we make
good decisions, that is, when we profit from our setting of the reserve price. When we
imagine that they are all on, we are imagining that we made good decisions (in retrospect).
When we fit the parameters to these data, we are using MAP estimation to find a mechanism
that helps us make such decisions.
We first derive our method for linear predictors of reserve price and show how to use the
expectation-maximization algorithm [3] to solve our MAP problem. We then show how
to generalize the approach to nonlinear predictors, such as kernel regression and neural
networks. Finally, on simulated data and real-world data from eBay, we show that this
approach outperforms the existing methods for setting the reserve price. It is both more
profitable and more easily scales to larger data sets.
Related work. Second-price auctions with reserve are first introduced in [1]. Ref. [4]
empirically demonstrates the importance of optimizing reserve prices; Their study quantifies
the positive impact it had on Yahoo!’s revenue. However, most previous work on optimizing
the reserve price are limited in that they do not consider features of the auction [4, 5].
Our work builds on the ideas in Ref. [6]. This research shows how to learn a linear mapping
from auction features to reserve prices, and demonstrates that we can increase profit when
we incorporate features into the reserve-price setting mechanism. We take a probabilistic
perspective on this problem, and show how to incorporate nonlinear predictors. We show
in Sec. 3 that our algorithms scale better and perform better than these approaches.
The objective variable framework also relates to recent ideas from reinforcement learning to
solve partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) [7, 8]. Solving an POMDP
amounts to finding an action policy that maximizes expected future return. Refs. [7, 8]
introduce a binary reward variable (similar to an objective variable) and use maximum
likelihood estimation to find such a policy. Our work solves a different problem with similar
ideas, but there are also differences between the methods. In one way, the problem in
reinforcement learning is more difficult because the reward is itself a function of the learned
policy; in auctions, the revenue function is known and fixed. In addition, the work in
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reinforcement learning focuses on simple discrete policies while we show how to use these
ideas for continuously parameterized predictors.
2 Objective Variables for Second-Price Auctions with Reserve
We first describe the problem setting and the objective. Our data come from previous
auctions. For each auction, we observe features xi, the highest bid Bi, and the second
highest bid bi. The features represent various characteristics of the auction, such as the
date, time of day, or properties of the item. For example, one of the auctions in the eBay
sport collectibles data set might be for a Stanley Kofax baseball card; its features include
the date of the auction and various aspects of the item, such as its condition and the average
price of such cards on the open market.
When we execute an auction we set a reserve price before seeing the bids; this determines
the revenue we receive after the bids are in. The revenue function (Eq. 1), which is indexed
by the bids, determines how much money we make as a function of the chosen reserve price.
We illustrate this function for 4 auctions from eBay in Fig. 1a. Our goal is to use the
historical data to learn how to profitably set the reserve price from auction features, that
is, before we see the bids.
For now we will use a linear function to map auction features to a good reserve price. Given
the feature vector xi, we set the reserve price with f(xi;w) = w
⊤xi. (In Sec. ?? we consider
nonlinear alternatives.) We fit the coefficients w from data, seeking w that maximizes the
regularized revenue
w∗ = argmax
N∑
i=1
R(f(xi;w), Bi, bi) + (λ/2)w
⊤w. (2)
We have chosen an L2 regularization controlled by parameter λ; other regularizers are also
possible.
Before we discuss our solution to this optimization, we make two related notes. First,
the previous reserve prices are not included in the data. Rather, our data tell us about the
relationship between features and bids. All the information about how much we might profit
from the auction is in the revenue function; the way previous sellers set the reserve prices is
not relevant. Second, our goal is not the same as learning a mapping from features to the
highest bid. Not all auctions are made equal: Consider the top left auction in Fig. 1a with
highest and second highest bid B1 = $43.03 and b1 = $17.5 compared to the bottom left
auction in Fig. 1a with both highest and second highest bids almost identical at B3 = $39.83
and b3 = $39.17. The profit margin in the first auction is much larger, so predicting the
reserve price for this auction well is much more important than when the two highest bids
are close to each other. We account for this by directly maximizing revenue, rather than by
modeling the highest bid.
2.1 The smoothed revenue
The optimization problem in Eq. 2 is difficult to solve because R(·) is discontinuous (and
thus non-convex). Previous work [6] addresses this problem by iteratively fitting differences
of convex (DC) surrogate functions and solving the resulting DC-program [9]. We define
an objective function related to the revenue, but that smooths out the troublesome discon-
tunuity. In the next section we show how to optimize this objective with an expectation-
maximization algorithm.
We first place a Gaussian distribution on the reserve price centered around the linear map-
ping, yi ∼ N (f(xi;w), σ2). We define the smoothed regularized revenue to be
L(w) =
N∑
i=1
logEyi [exp {−R(yi, Bi, bi)}]− (λ/2)w
⊤w. (3)
Figure 1b shows one term from Eq. 3 and how – for a specific auction – the smoothed
revenue becomes closer to the original revenue function as σ2 decreases. This approach was
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inspired by probit regression, where a Gaussian expectation is introduced to smooth the
discontinuous 0-1 loss [10, 11].
We now have a well-defined and continuous objective function; in principle, we can use
gradient methods to fit the parameters. However, we will fit them by recasting the problem
as a regularized likelihood under a latent variable model and then using the expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm [3]. This leads to closed-form updates in both the E and M
steps, and facilitates replacing linear regression with a nonlinear predictor.
2.2 Objective variables
To reformulate our optimization problem, we introduce the idea of the the objective variable.
Objective variables are part of a probabilistic model for which MAP estimation recovers the
parameter w that maximizes the smoothed revenue in Eq. 3. Specifically, we define binary
variables zi for each auction, each conditioned on the reserve price yi, the highest bid Bi,
and next bid bi. We can interpret these variables to indicate “Is the auction host satisfied
with the outcome?” Concretely, the likelihood of satisfaction is related to how profitable
the auction was relative to the maximum profit, p(zi = 1 | yi, Bi, bi) = pi(yi, Bi, bi) where
pi(yi, Bi, bi) = exp {−(Bi −R(yi, Bi, bi))} . (4)
The revenue function R(·) is in Eq. 1. The revenue is bounded by Bi; thus the probability
is in (0, 1].
What we will do is set up a probability model around the objective variables, assume that
they are all “observed” to be equal to one (i.e., we are satisfied with all of our auction
outcomes), and then fit the parameter w to maximize the posterior conditioned on this
”hallucinated data”. Fig. 2b provides visual intuition why the modes of the posterior
are profitable. For fixed w the posterior of yi is proportional to the product of its prior
centered at f(xi;w) and the likelihood of the objective variable (Eq. 4) which captures the
profitability of each possible reserve price prediction.
Consider the following model,
w ∼ N (0, λ−1I) (5)
yi |w, xi ∼ N (f(xi;w), σ
2) i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (6)
zi | yi, Bi, bi ∼ Bernoulli(pi(yi, Bi, bi)) (7)
where f(xi;w) = x
⊤
i w is a linear map (for now). This is illustrated as a graphical model in
Fig. ??.
Now consider a data set z where all of the objective variables zi are equal to one. Conditional
on this data, the log posterior of w marginalizes out the latent reserve prices yi,
log p(w | z,x,B,b) = log p(w |λ) +
N∑
i=1
(logE [exp{R(yi, Bi, bi)}]−Bi)− C, (8)
where C is the normalizer. This is the smoothed revenue of Eq. 3 plus a constant involving
the top bids Bi in Eq. 4, constant components of the prior on w, and the normalizer. Thus,
we can optimize the smoothed revenue by taking MAP estimates of w.
As we mentioned above, we have defined variables corresponding to the auction host’s sat-
isfaction. With historical data of auction attributes and bids, we imagine that the host was
satisfied with every auction. When we fit w, we ask for the reserve-price-setting mechanism
that leads to such an outcome.
2.3 MAP estimation with expectation-maximization
The EM algorithm is a technique for maximum likelihood estimation in the face of hidden
variables [3]. (When there are regularizers, it is a technique for MAP estimation.) In the E-
step, we compute the posterior distribution of the hidden variables given the current model
settings; in the M-step, we maximize the expected complete regularized log likelihood, where
the expectation is taken with respect to the previously computed posterior.
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Figure 2: The objective variable framework transforms the revenue maximization task into
a MAP estimation task. The model and the hallucinated data are designed such that the
modes of the model’s posterior are the local maxima of the smoothed revenue in Eq. 3
.
In the OV model, the latent variables are the reserve prices y; the observations are the
objective variables z; and the model parameters are the coefficients w. We compute the
posterior expectation of the latent reserve prices in the E-step and fit the model parameters
in the M-step. This is a coordinate ascent algorithm on the expected complete regularized
log likelihood of the model and the data. Each E-step tightens the bound on the likelihood
and the new bound is then optimized in the M-step.
E-step. At iteration t, the E-step computes the conditional distribution of the latent
reserve prices yi given the objective variables zi = 1 and the parameters w
(t−1) of the
previous iteration. It is
p(yi|zi = 1, w
(t−1)) ∝ p(zi = 1|yi)p(yi|w
(t−1)) (9)
∝ exp {−(Bi −R(yi, Bi, bi)}φ
(
yi − f(xi;w(t−1))
σ
)
. (10)
where φ(·) is the pdf of the standard normal distribution. The normalizing constant is in
the appendix in Eq. 15; we compute it by integrating Eq. 9 over the real line. We can
then compute the posterior expectation E
[
yi | zi, w(t−1)
]
by using the moment generating
function. (See Eq. 18,Sec. A)
M-step. The M-step maximizes the complete joint log-likelihood with respect to the model
parameters w. When we use a linear predictor to set the reserve prices, i.e. f(xi;w) = x
⊤
i w,
the M-step has a closed form update, which amounts to ridge regression against response
variables E
[
yi | zi, w(t−1)
]
(Eq. 18) computed in the E-step. The update is
w(t) =
(
λI +
1
σ2
x⊤x
)−1
1
σ2
x⊤E
[
y | z, w(t−1)
]
(11)
where E
[
y | z, w(t−1)
]
denotes the vector with ith entry E
[
yi | z, w(t−1)
]
and similarly x is
a matrix of all feature vectors xi.
Algorithm details. To initialize, we set the expected reserve prices to be the highest
bids E[yi | zi] = Bi and run an M-step. The algorithm then alternates between updating the
weights using Eq. 11 in the M-step and then integrating out the latent reserve prices in the
E-step. The algorithm terminates when the change in revenue on a validation set is below
a threshold. (We use 10−5.)
The E-step is linear in the number of auctions N and can be parallelized since the expected
reserve prices are conditionally independent in our model. The least squares update has
asymptotic complexity O(d2N) where d is the number of features.
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2.4 Nonlinear Objective Variable Models
One of the advantages of our EM algorithm is that we can change the parameterized pre-
diction technique f(xi;w) from which we map auction features to the mean of the reserve
price. So far we have only considered linear predictors; here we show how we can adapt
the algorithm to nonlinear predictors. As we will see in Sec. 3, these nonlinear predictors
outperform the linear predictors.
In our framework, much of the model in Fig. 2a and corresponding algorithm remains the
same even when considering nonlinear predictors. The distribution of the objective variables
is unchanged (Eq. 4) as well as the E-step update in the EM algorithm (Eq. 18). All of the
changes are in the M-step.
Kernel regression. Kernel regression [12] maps the features xi into a higher dimen-
sional space through feature map ψ(·); the mechanism for setting the reserve price becomes
f(xi;w) = ψ(xi)
Tw. In kernel regression we work with the N ×N Gram matrix K of inner
products, where Kij = ψ(xi)
Tψ(xj). In this work we use a polynomial kernel of degree
D, and thus compute the gram matrix without evaluating the feature map ψ(·) explicitly,
K = (x⊤x+ 1)D.
Rather than learning the weights directly, kernel methods operate in the dual space α ∈ RN .
If Ki is the i
th column of the Gram matrix, then the mean of the reserve price is
f(xi;w) = ψ(xi)
Tw = KTi α. (12)
The corresponding M-step in the algorithm becomes
α(t) =
(
1
σ2
K + λIN
)−1
1
σ2
E[y | z, α(t−1)]. (13)
See [13] for the technical details around kernel regression.
We will demonstrate in Sec. 3 that replacing linear regression with kernel regression can
lead to better reserve price predictions. However, working with the Gram matrices comes at
a computational cost and we consider neural networks as a scalable alternative to infusing
nonlinearity into the model.
Neural networks. We also explore an objective variable model that uses a neural
network [14] to set the mean reserve prices. We use a network with one hidden layer of H
units and activation function tanh(·). The parameters of the neural net are the weights of
the first layer and the second layer: w = {w(1) ∈ RH×d, w(2) ∈ R1×H}. The mean of the
reserve price is
f(xi;w) = w
(2)(tanh(w(1)xi)). (14)
The M-step is no longer analytic; Instead, the network is trained using stochastic gradient
methods.
3 Empirical Study
We studied our algorithms with two simulated data sets and a large collection of real-world
auction data from eBay. In each study, we fit a model on a subset of the data (using a
validation set to set hyperparameters) and then test how profitable we would be if we used
the fitted model to set reserve prices in a held out set. Our objective variable methods
outperformed the existing state of the art.
Data sets and replications. We evaluated our method on both simulated data and
real-world data.
• Linear simulated data. Our simplest simulated data contains d = 5 auction features. We
drew features xi ∼ N(0, I) ∈ Rd for 2,000 auctions; we drew a ground truth weight vector
wˆ ∼ N (0, I) ∈ Rd and an intercept α ∼ N (0, 1); we drew the highest bids for each auction
from the regression Bi ∼ N (w
⊤xi + α, 0.1) and set the second bids bi = Bi/2. (Data
for which Bi is negative are discarded and re-drawn.) We split into Ntrain = 1000 and
Nvalid = Ntest = 500.
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Table 1: The performance of the EM algorithms from Sec. 2 (OV Regression, OV Kernel
Regression with degree 2 and 4, OV Neural Networks) against the current state of the
art (DC [6] and NoF [5]). We report results in terms of percentage of maximum possible
revenue (computed by an oracle that knows the highest bid in advance). For each data set,
we report mean and standard error aggregated from ten train/validation/test splits. Our
methods outperform the existing methods on all data.
OV Reg OV Kern (2) OV Kern (4) OV NN DC [6] NoF [5]
Linear Sim. 81.4± 0.2 81.2 ± 0.2 78.2± 0.6 72.2± 1.5 80.3 ± 0.3 49.9 ± 0.1
Nonlinear Sim. 50.3 ± 0.3 66.2 ± 0.4 70.1± 0.6 63.7± 2.9 59.4 ± 2.0 49.9 ± 0.2
eBay (s) 61.0 ± 0.7 63.7 ± 3.0 63.4± 2.8 74.4± 1.1 59.5 ± 1.1 55.8 ± 0.3
eBay (L) 62.4 ± 0.2 - - 84.0± 0.2 - 56.0 ± 0.1
• Nonlinear simulated data. These data contain features xi, true coefficients wˆ, and inter-
cept α generated as for the linear data. We generate highest bids by taking the absolute
value of those generated by the regression and second highest bids by halving them, as
above. Taking the absolute value introduces a nonlinear relationship between features
and bids.
• Data from eBay. Our real-world data is auctions of sports collectibles from eBay.2 There
are d = 74 features. All covariates are centered and rescaled to have mean zero and
standard deviation one. We analyze two data sets from eBay, one small and one large.
On the small data set, the total number of auctions is 6, 000, split into Ntrain = Nvalid =
Ntest = 2, 000. On the large data set the total number is 70,000, split intoNtrain = 50, 000,
and Nvalid = Ntest = 10, 000.
In our study, we fit each method on the training data, use the validation set to decide on
hyperparameters, and then evaluate the fitted predictor on the test set, i.e., compute how
much revenue we make when we use it to set reserve prices. For each data set, we replicate
each study ten times, each time randomly creating the training set, test set, and validation
set.
Algorithms. We describe the objective variable algorithms from Sec. 2, all of which we
implemented in Theano [15, 16], as well as the two previous methods we compare against.
• OV Regression. OV Regression learns a linear predictor w for reserve prices using the
algorithm in Sec. 2.3. We find a good setting for the smoothing parameter σ and regu-
larization parameter λ using grid search.
• OV Kernel Regression. OV Kernel Regression uses a polynomial kernel to predict the
mean of the reserve price; we study polynomial kernels of degree 2 and 4.
• OV Neural Network. OV Neural Network fits a neural net for predicting the reserve
prices. As we discussed in Sec. 2.4, the M-step uses gradient optimization; we used
stochastic gradient ascent with a constant learning rate and early stopping [17]. Further,
we used a warm-start approach, where the next M-step is initialized with the results of
the previous M-step. We set the number of hidden units to H = 5 for the simulated data
and H = 100 for the eBay data. We use grid search to set the smoothing parameter σ,
the regularization parameters, the learning rate, the batch size, and the number of passes
over the data for each M-step.
• Difference of Convex Functions (DC) [6]. The DC algorithm finds a linear predictor of
reserve price with an iterative procedure based on DC-programming [9]. Grid search is
used on the regularization parameter as well as the margin to select the surrogates for
the auction loss.
• No Features (NoF) [5]. This is the state-of-the-art approach to set the reserve prices
when we do not consider the auction’s features. The algorithm iterates over the highest
bids in the training set and evaluates the profitability of setting all reserve prices to this
value on the training set. Ref. [6] gives a more efficient algorithm based on sorting.
2This data set comes from http://cims.nyu.edu/ munoz/data/index.html
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Results. Tab. 1 gives the results of our study. The metric is the percentage of the
highest possible revenue, where an oracle anticipates the bids and sets the reserve price to
the highest bid.
A trivial strategy (not reported) sets all reserve prices to zero, and thus earns the second
highest bid on each auction. The algorithm using no features [5] does slightly better than
this but not as well as the algorithms which use features. OV Regression [this paper] and
DC [6] both fit linear mappings and exhibit similar performance. However, the DC algorithm
does not scale to the large eBay data set.
The nonlinear OV algorithms (OV Kernel Regression and OV Neural Networks) outperform
the linear models on the nonlinear simulated data and the real-world data. Note that the
kernel algorithms do not scale to the large eBay data set because working with the Gram
matrix becomes infeasible as the training set gets large. OV Neural Networks significantly
outperforms the existing methods on the real-world data. This is a viable solution to
maximizing profit from historical auction data.
4 Summary and Discussion
We developed the objective variable framework for combining probabilistic modeling with
optimal decision making. We used this method to solve the problem of how to set the reserve
price in second-price auctions. Our algorithms scaled better and outperformed the current
state of the art on both simulated and real-world data.
A Appendix - Update Equations for EM
The normalizing constant Ci of Eq. 9 can be computed by integrating Eq. 9 over the real
line. Let µi = f(xi;w
(t−1)). Up to a constant factor of eBi the normalizing constant Ci
then equals
Cie
Bi =
∫ bi
−∞
ebiφ(
yi − µi
σ
)dyi +
∫ Bi
bi
eyiφ(
yi − µi
σ
) +
∫ ∞
Bi
φ(
yi − µi
σ
) (15)
=σebiΦ(
bi − µi
σ
) + σeµi+
σ
2
2
[
Φ(
Bi − (µi + σ2)
σ
)− Φ(
bi − (µi + σ2)
σ
)
]
+ σ
[
1− Φ(
Bi − µi
σ
)
]
. (16)
Computing the expectation of the latent reserve price E[yi] entails evaluating the moment
generating functionMi(s) = E[e
syi ], where expectation is taken w.r.t. the posterior p(yi|zi =
1, w(t−1)). Taking the derivative with respect to s and setting s = 0 then yields the desired
expectation.
E[yi] =
dMi(s)
ds
∣∣∣∣
s=0
(17)
=
σebi
Ci
µiΦ(
bi − µi
σ
)−
σ2ebi
Ci
φ(
bi − µi
σ
) +
σ
Ci
(µi + σ
2)eµi+
σ
2
2 Φ(
Bi − (µi + σ2)
σ
)
−
σ
Ci
(µi + σ
2)eµi+
σ
2
2 Φ(
bi − (µi + σ2)
σ
) +
σ
Ci
µi
[
1− Φ(
Bi − µi
σ
)
]
−
σ2
Ci
eµi+
σ
2
2
[
φ(
Bi − (µi + σ2)
σ
)− φ(
bi − (µi + σ2)
σ
)
]
+
σ2
Ci
φ(
−µi
σ
) (18)
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